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OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
 
 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
 John Holbrook sued several shipping companies and 
manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos products, alleging that 
he developed mesothelioma from exposure to asbestos-containing 
products while working aboard the shipping companies' vessels. 
John Holbrook died in October of 1993, and his widow, Grace 
Holbrook, administratrix of his estate, was substituted as 
plaintiff.  The jury found for defendants on liability.  Holbrook 
now challenges several evidentiary rulings by the district court, 
including the court's rulings:  1) excluding testimony from the 
decedent's treating physician on his diagnosis of mesothelioma; 
2) excluding testimony from a pulmonologist eliminating radiation 
as a cause of John Holbrook's mesothelioma; 3) allowing testimony 
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by two defense experts on radiation exposure as a cause; and,  4) 
redacting references to mesothelioma contained in various 
documents.  Holbrook argues that the trial judge's conduct was 
unfair and requests a new trial before a different judge.  We 
conclude that the court's conduct did not prevent a fair trial, 
but that the court committed reversible error by excluding 
testimony from appellant's experts.  We will reverse and remand 
the cause for a new trial. 
I. 
 Holbrook served as a merchant seaman aboard the shipping 
companies' vessels from 1953 to 1991.  He also served aboard ship 
in the South Pacific for seven months in 1962 during a government 
nuclear testing operation called "Dominic I."  At trial, Holbrook 
sought to prove that John Holbrook died from mesothelioma as a 
result of asbestos exposure aboard the shipping vessels.  The 
defendants contended that the exposure to asbestos, if any, was 
minimal and could not have caused mesothelioma, and that if John 
Holbrook suffered from mesothelioma, it resulted from radiation 
exposure during Dominic I.  Both sides contested the 
admissibility of various experts' testimony. 
 The district court excluded certain testimony by Dr. 
Carpenter, Holbrook's treating physician, and by Dr. Altschuler, 
a board-certified physician in internal and pulmonary medicine. 
The court felt that they lacked the requisite specialization to 
testify as to certain matters.  It based its ruling, in part, on 
its conclusion that mesothelioma and its cause is difficult to 
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diagnose, and that only a few types of medical specialists would 
qualify to give expert opinion testimony about it. 
A. 
 The Federal Rules of Evidence embody a "strong and 
undeniable preference for admitting any evidence having some 
potential for assisting the trier of fact."  DeLuca v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 956 (3d Cir. 1990). "Rule 
702, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, 
specifically embraces this policy," United States v. Velasquez, 
64 F.3d 844, 849 (3d Cir. 1995), and has a liberal policy of 
admissibility.  In re Paoli R.R. Yard Litigation ("Paoli II"), 35 
F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994).  Together, Rules 702 and 104(a) 
instruct the district court in determining the admissibility of 
expert testimony.  Rule 702 provides: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise. 
Under Rule 104(a), the district court makes preliminary 
determinations whether the proposed expert witness is qualified 
and whether the testimony to be given is admissible under Rule 
702.  See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. 
Ct. 2786, 2796 (1993).  This preliminary task ensures that the 
testimony meets a minimum threshold of reliability and relevance. 
Id. at 2795; Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 829. 
 Under Rule 702, (1) the proffered witness must be an expert; 
(2) testify about matters requiring scientific, technical or 
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specialized knowledge; and (3) the expert's testimony must assist 
the trier of fact.  Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 741-42.  Holbrook's 
first allegation of error, the court's ruling excluding testimony 
by her experts, concerns the first requirement.  The issue of the 
admissibility of the defense experts' testimony, discussed in 
section III, infra, involves the other two requirements. 
B.  Dr. Carpenter 
 
 The first requirement of Rule 702 -- that the 
proposed witness be an expert -- has been liberally 
construed by this Court.  Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 741. "We 
have held that a broad range of knowledge, skills, and 
training qualify an expert as such," and have "eschewed 
imposing overly rigorous requirements of expertise." 
Id.; see also Hammond v. International Harvester Co., 
691 F.2d 646, 653 (3d Cir. 1982)(permitting engineer 
with sales experience in automotive and agricultural 
equipment, who also taught high school automobile 
repair, to testify in products liability action 
involving tractors). 
Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 849. 
 Dr. Carpenter, John Holbrook's treating physician, 
specializes in internal medicine.  At trial, Dr. Carpenter 
described the medical procedures undertaken to diagnose and treat 
John Holbrook.  In great detail, he described the treatment, 
including his injection of the chemotherapeutic agent 
fluorouracil into his patient's chest cavity.  During Carpenter's 
direct examination, when the subject turned to whether he 
designed the treatment for a specific malignancy, the court 
interrupted and stated: 
He gave the treatment that he gave.  This witness has 
not been qualified and he will not be permitted to give 
an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty 
as to whether or not the cancer was mesothelioma. 
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 The court prevented the treating physician from testifying: 
(1) that he made a diagnosis for which he treated Mr. Holbrook; 
(2) that his diagnosis was mesothelioma; (3) as to his 
preliminary impression of the decedent; (4) as to the diagnosis 
in the pathology report analyzing a tissue sample of Holbrook's 
lungs, a report which Dr. Carpenter requested and on which he 
relied in treating his patient; and (5) as to the decedent's 
symptoms.  The court excluded this testimony because Dr. 
Carpenter was not an oncologist or a specialist in what the court 
inexplicably termed "definitive cancer diagnosis."  Referring to 
Dr. Carpenter's reliance on the pathology report, the court 
interjected that Dr. Carpenter did not make his own diagnosis, 
despite the fact that Dr. Carpenter testified that he did exactly 
that.   
 Dr. Carpenter testified that he routinely relies on 
pathology reports to assist him in treating his patients, because 
pathologists have more experience examining and diagnosing tissue 
specimens.  Specifically, Dr. Carpenter relied on the pathology 
report he had ordered to confirm his clinical impression and 
diagnosis of John Holbrook.  Dr. Carpenter's reliance on the 
pathology report to confirm his diagnosis does not reflect 
negatively on his qualifications or ability to diagnose his 
patient; to the contrary, it reflects routine procedure in 
medical treatment, as recognized by Rule 703.  
 Because of our liberal approach to admitting expert 
testimony, most arguments about an expert's qualifications relate 
more to the weight to be given the expert's testimony, than to 
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its admissibility.  Thus, witnesses may be competent to testify 
as experts even though they may not, in the court's eyes, be the 
"best" qualified.  Who is "best" qualified is a matter of weight 
upon which reasonable jurors may disagree. 
 In Paoli II, we reversed the district court's finding that a 
witness was not qualified because we found that the doctor, 
"while arguably a relatively poor clinician and less than fully 
credible witness, qualifie[d] as an expert." 35 F.3d at 753. 
Similarly, in re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation ("Paoli I"), 916 
F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), we stated that: 
insistence on a certain kind of degree or background is 
inconsistent with our jurisprudence in this area.  The 
language of Rule 702 and the accompanying advisory 
notes make it clear that various kinds of "knowledge 
skill, experience, training or education," Fed. R. 
Evid. 702, qualify an expert as such. 
Id. at 855.  Following this logic, it is an abuse of discretion 
to exclude testimony simply because the trial court does not deem 
the proposed expert to be the best qualified or because the 
proposed expert does not have the specialization that the court 
considers most appropriate.  Id. at 856. 
 The court's mistaken approach restricted Dr. Carpenter's 
testimony based on a requirement that the witness practice a 
particular specialty to testify concerning certain matters.  In 
light of our liberal standard governing the qualifications of a 
proffered expert witness, and our acceptance of more general 
qualifications, we hold that the district court erred by finding 
that Dr. Carpenter was not qualified to render a diagnosis or to 
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discuss the pathology report because he was not a pathologist, 
oncologist or expert in "definitive cancer diagnosis."1   
 The Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rule 703, the 
corollary to Rule 702, refer to, inter alia, reliance on reports 
of others, and further illustrate the trial court's error.  The 
Notes provide: 
a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on 
information from numerous sources and of considerable 
variety, including statements by patients and 
relatives, reports and opinions from nurses, 
technicians and other doctors, hospital records, and X 
rays.  Most of them are admissible in evidence, but 
only with the expenditure of substantial time in 
producing and examining various authenticating 
witnesses.  The physician makes life-and-death 
decisions in reliance upon them.  His validation, 
expertly performed and subject to cross-examination, 
ought to suffice for judicial purposes. 
 The Federal Rules of Evidence are meant to instruct the 
district courts in the sound exercise of their discretion in 
making admissibility determinations and should not be interpreted 
as exclusionary rules.  It would be inconsistent and run counter 
to the Rules' liberal policy of admissibility to allow an outside 
                                                           
1Federal Rule of Evidence 102 provides that: 
 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in 
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense 
and delay, and promotion of growth and development of 
the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined. 
 
Our approach to expert qualifications comports with the liberal 
policy of admissibility embodied in the rules and with the 
mandate of Rule 102.  The district court's approach, however, 
would unjustly increase litigation costs by requiring litigants 
in countless cases to hire a host of experts out of fear that 
their treating physicians, in whom they entrusted their health 
and lives, would not "make the grade" when it came time to 
testify in court. 
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expert, hired solely for litigation purposes, to rely on and 
testify about a pathology report, but exclude testimony by the 
treating physician who ordered the report and relied on it for 
life and death decisions about the patient's treatment.  Opinions 
by physicians who have neither examined nor treated a patient 
"have less probative force, as a general matter, then they would 
have if they had treated or examined him."  Wier ex rel. Wier v. 
Heckler, 734 F.2d 955, 963 (3d Cir. 1984).  In the context of 
social security disability cases, in fact, we afford greater 
weight to a treating physician's opinion. See Dorf v. Bowen, 794 
F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1986); Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581 (3d 
Cir. 1986).  "The rationale for giving greater weight to a 
treating physician's opinion is that he is employed to cure and 
has a greater opportunity to know and observe his patient. . . ." 
Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987).  We 
conclude that the court erred by excluding the treating 
physician's testimony. 
C. Dr. Altschuler 
 The district judge's ruling on Dr. Altschuler's 
qualifications suffers from the same flaw.2  Dr. Altschuler is 
board-certified in and practices internal and pulmonary medicine. 
Dr. Altschuler described his primary practice area as follows: 
[P]ulmonary medicine involves the diseases of the chest 
and lungs.  It involves medical treatment, certain 
                                                           
2
  Defendants do not address the court's ruling on Dr. 
Altschuler's testimony, other than to argue that Holbrook was 
allowed to ask questions regarding the literature on radiation 
and mesothelioma, that Dr. Altschuler is not very knowledgeable 
in the field, and that he makes a habit of testifying on behalf 
of plaintiffs. 
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procedures such as looking into the lungs of patients. 
It involves an expertise in reading chest x-rays and 
understanding pulmonary function tests which are 
breathing tests.  It involves treatment of occupational 
diseases that affect the chest. 
Mesothelioma is a pulmonary disease. 
 Dr. Altschuler testified that he was familiar with John 
Holbrook's occupational work history, medical history and 
records, and was also familiar with the literature on causal 
agents of mesothelioma, but was not aware that radiation had ever 
been linked to mesothelioma.  At his deposition, he could not 
recall a firm linkage between mesothelioma and radiation.  At 
trial, he stated that he had "found a few articles relating to 
sporadic rare cases out of the thousands of cases of mesothelioma 
each year, there are a few over the last 15 or 20 years that have 
shown some relationship to radiation."  Read as a whole, Dr. 
Altschuler's testimony at trial suggests that his previous 
inability to recall specific literature linking radiation to 
mesothelioma resulted from his conclusion, based on his 
familiarity with the literature, that sporadic rare cases in the 
literature did not support radiation as a major causative factor. 
The district court, however, did not disallow testimony based on 
Dr. Altschuler's familiarity, or alleged lack thereof, with the 
literature on radiation and mesothelioma. 
 When asked about radiation as a cause of mesothelioma, the 
court sustained a defense objection, ruling that Dr. Altschuler 
was not "qualified as a 'radiation expert' vis-a-vis cancer. He's 
not an oncologist," and would not allow him to discuss the 
relationship between radiation and mesothelioma.  The court 
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erroneously required that the expert have a specialization in 
cancer and radiation, despite his expertise in lung diseases, 
including mesothelioma.  In placing restrictions on Dr. 
Altschuler's testimony because he did not possess the exact 
background it deemed appropriate, the court erred. 
II. 
 Holbrook next alleges that the court erred by allowing 
defense experts, Drs. Demopoulos and Browne, to testify that 
radiation caused John Holbrook's cancer, and by not preliminarily 
making the determination on admissibility of this testimony.   
Holbrook's position is that this testimony lacked a sufficient 
scientific basis under Rule 702, as interpreted by Daubert. 
The second requirement of Rule 702 -- that the expert 
testify to scientific, technical or other specialized 
knowledge -- is intended to ensure the reliability or 
trustworthiness of the expert's testimony. 
Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 849 (citation omitted). 
 Defendants sought to prove through these experts that John 
Holbrook's cancer resulted from exposure to radiation in Dominic 
I.  Drs. Demopoulos and Browne were permitted to testify, over 
plaintiff's objections, that radiation exposure in 1962, as 
opposed to prolonged asbestos exposure, was a distinct possible 
cause, a very highly probable cause, and the most probable cause 
of his cancer diagnosed three decades later.  
A. 
 Under Daubert's interpretation of Rule 104(a), a district 
court facing a proffer of scientific expert testimony must as a 
preliminary matter assess whether the reasoning or methodology 
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underlying the expert's testimony is scientifically valid.  The 
court accomplishes this "by considering all relevant factors that 
may bear on the reliability of the proffered evidence." 
Velasquez, 64 F.3d at 849; see also Paoli II, 35 F.3d at 742. The 
reliability requirement, however, should not be applied too 
strictly.  Helpfulness to the trier of fact remains the ultimate 
touchstone of admissibility.  If the expert has "good grounds" 
for the testimony, the scientific evidence is deemed sufficiently 
reliable.  A determination that the expert has good grounds 
assures that the expert's opinions are based on science rather 
than "subjective belief or unsupported speculation." Daubert, 113 
S. Ct. at 2795.   
B. 
 Holbrook argues that the district court failed in its 
gatekeeping responsibility by allowing the jury to hear the 
radiation testimony without first determining its admissibility. 
The record shows otherwise.  The court scheduled a pretrial 
Daubert hearing at plaintiff's request to determine if the expert 
testimony regarding radiation exposure as a cause of mesothelioma 
was admissible.  Inexplicably, Holbrook's counsel seemed 
unprepared to proceed with that hearing, and the court therefore 
did not hold one.  Despite this, the court nevertheless indicated 
to Holbrook's counsel that it would entertain counsel's motion at 
trial to strike the expert testimony.  
 Although Daubert ordinarily could be construed to require 
that the court make the preliminary determination outside the 
jury's hearing, we cannot say that the court abused its 
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discretion in adhering to the requirements of Rules 104 and 702. 
The court adequately explained its reasoning when it stated: 
I will not have a hearing of such length while a jury 
is waiting to be selected . . . . This was your 
opportunity for a Daubert hearing today and tomorrow. 
It is improper to have jurors waiting for several days 
to be selected in a case that might go on for weeks. 
Counsel failed to prepare appropriately and the court exercised 
sound discretion in controlling the efficient and orderly 
disposition of this case to avoid unnecessary inconvenience to 
the jury.  
C. 
 We also find no error in the court's refusal to strike the 
testimony.  Dr. Demopoulos specializes in pathology -- the study 
of disease.  His research has focused largely on the study of 
cancer, a subject in which he has taught, and on which he has 
written articles.  During his residency, he performed radiation 
studies on animals, and during a tenure with the National 
Institutes of Health, he studied radiation pathology.  Currently, 
Dr. Demopoulos devises experiments to enhance the susceptibility 
of tumors to radiation and to enhance the protective effects in 
surrounding tissue to protect it from damage.  His testimony 
revealed extensive knowledge of radiation oncogenesis, 
familiarity with the Dominic I Operation and familiarity with the 
radiation exposure history of John Holbrook.   
 With this background, Dr. Demopoulos testified that, unlike 
exposure to asbestos, there is no threshold exposure to radiation 
required to cause cancer, and that "[t]he most probable cause of 
Mr. Holbrook's cancer was the exposures that he sustained at 
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Dominic I operations in 1962."  He based his opinion on a review 
of Mr. Holbrook's medical records and exposure to radiation, and 
on his own research and study.    
 Dr. Browne specializes in occupational lung disease, and his 
research initially focused on mesothelioma.  He has made 
presentations at scientific gatherings regarding threshold levels 
of exposure to asbestos and resulting mesothelioma, and has 
published several papers.  At trial, he discussed his extensive 
knowledge about studies of radiation as a cause of cancer, 
including mesothelioma.  He testified, based on the medical and 
scientific literature relating to radiation and cancer, that low 
doses of radiation can cause cancer, including mesothelioma, and 
that unlike asbestos exposure, there is no threshold requirement 
of exposure for radiation to cause cancer.  He further testified 
that, in his opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, 
radiation exposure could not be excluded as a cause of John 
Holbrook's cancer. 
 Both experts' extensive backgrounds in the study of 
mesothelioma and its causes, including radiation, their review of 
the literature and their review of John Holbrook's history 
provided substance upon which they could offer scientific 
opinions that met the required threshold of reliability.  As 
required by Daubert, their procedures for examining the facts 
presented to them and their own research methodologies were based 
on the methods of science and did not reveal opinion based merely 
on their own subjective beliefs.   
D.  
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In a related matter, Holbrook objects to portions of the defense 
experts' testimony, arguing that in several instances the 
testimony was not given to the degree of certainty required. 
Holbrook cites Paoli II and Schulz v. Celotex Corp., 942 F.2d 204 
(3d Cir. 1991), for the proposition that medical experts must 
testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty. 
In one instance at trial, the court sustained a defense objection 
during cross-examination, questioning whether Dr. Browne could 
state with reasonable medical certainty that radiation exposure 
caused decedent's mesothelioma.  The court ruled that the 
question was solely for the jury.  Dr. Browne's answer would have 
helped the jury to evaluate the impact of his testimony on 
plaintiff's evidence that asbestos exposure caused John 
Holbrook's cancer.  Although a specific degree of certainty may 
not be required, the court erred by not allowing Holbrook to pose 
the question. 
We have not required that when medical experts give their 
opinion, they recite the talismanic phrase that their opinion is 
given to "a reasonable degree of medical certainty," because 
"[c]are must be taken . . . to see that the incantation does not 
become a semantic trap and the failure to voice it is not used as 
a basis for exclusion without analysis of the testimony itself." 
Schulz, 942 F.2d at 208.  Nonetheless, as we stated in Schulz, 
the phrase "is a useful shorthand expression that is helpful in 
forestalling challenges to the admissibility of expert 
testimony."  Id. at 208.  It also assists a reviewing court in 
determining whether the jury has been given the appropriate 
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standard by which to judge the opinion.  The district court, 
therefore, erred by disallowing cross-examination of Dr. Browne 
to determine whether his opinion met this degree of certainty. 
In another instance cited by Holbrook, the court overruled an 
objection to Dr. Browne's testimony, in which he stated  
that radiation is a distinct possible cause.  I have no 
way of telling whether it is to a degree of medical 
certainty the cause. 
"Situations in which the failure to qualify the opinion have 
resulted in exclusion are typically those in which the expert 
testimony is speculative, using such language as 'possibility.'" 
Id. at 208.  The Federal Rules of Evidence, however, do not 
require a particular phrase regarding the degree of certainty 
with which experts must form their opinions, but they certainly 
allow questions concerning the degree to which the opinion is 
held. 
Accordingly, while the particular phrase used should 
not be dispositive, it may indicate the level of 
confidence the expert has in the expressed opinion. 
Perhaps nothing is absolutely certain in the field of 
medicine, but the intent of the law is that if a 
physician cannot form an opinion with sufficient 
certainty so as to make a medical judgment, neither can 
a jury use that information to reach a decision. 
Id. at 209. 
In Schulz, we reversed the trial court's decision to exclude an 
expert's testimony because counsel failed to preface the question 
with the precise phrase, because we found that the expert's 
testimony possessed the requisite degree of certainty for 
admissibility.  The expert stated his opinion in unequivocal 
terms and his opinion was relied on extensively in the treatment 
of the plaintiff. 
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It is true that in Paoli II, we reversed a summary judgment on 
certain claims because the plaintiff's expert had not testified 
to a degree of medical certainty.  We required that degree of 
certainty in Paoli II because, under Pennsylvania law, the burden 
of proof required that degree of certainty.   
Here, the test is different.  Drs. Demopoulos and Browne 
testified for the defense that radiation could not be excluded, 
as it was a distinct possible cause of John Holbrook's cancer. In 
fact, Dr. Browne testified on this issue to a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty.  Although that testimony would have been 
insufficient to prove that radiation exposure caused the cancer, 
a burden which the defense did not bear, it was sufficiently 
certain and could help the jury to evaluate testimony by 
plaintiff's experts that asbestos exposure caused the cancer, an 
issue on which plaintiff bore the burden of proof. Therefore, the 
court did not err when it refused to strike the defense experts' 
testimony. 
III. 
Holbrook also challenges the district court's ruling that 
references to mesothelioma in various documents must be redacted. 
Holbrook contends that she properly moved for admission of the 
death certificate, autopsy report and hospital records, including 
the references in them to mesothelioma, under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 803(6),(8)-(9).  The court, however, required under Rule 
4033 that references to malignant mesothelioma be deleted because 
                                                           
3Rule 403 provides: 
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the authors of the documents did not testify about the bases of 
their diagnoses.  In so ruling, the court stated that "[t]he 
diagnosis of mesothelioma is a diagnosis that must be subjected 
to cross-examination in order for it to be meaningful to a jury." 
Rule 803 does not mandate admission of this evidence, but rather 
allows evidence to be admitted when it would otherwise be 
objectionable hearsay.  Thus, Rule 403 always remains as a 
potential bar to admissibility.  Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.  
Holbrook's statement that "Records of deaths are simply 
admissible 'as is,'" is simply wrong, ignoring our decisions in 
Schulz and Pollard v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 598 F.2d 1284 
(1979).  Although in Schulz we did not reach the issue whether 
the district court properly refused to admit a death certificate 
indicating asbestosis when the etiology of plaintiff's cancer was 
in dispute, we clearly indicated that the court's analysis under 
Rule 403 was in order.  942 F.2d at 209.   
"[A] trial judge's decision to admit or exclude evidence under 
[Rule 403] may not be reversed unless it is arbitrary and 
irrational," Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 F.2d 184, 187 
(3d Cir. 1990), but the trial court should articulate its 
balancing analysis.  Glass v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 
188, 191 (3d Cir. 1994).  That a district court failed to take 
the opportunity to articulate its balancing does not constitute 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
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reversible error per se; however, it may require that the 
appellate court do so. See id. at 192. 
In Pollard we upheld the trial judge's redaction under Rule 403 
of references to "accidental death" from a death certificate, 
coroner's certificate and pathologist's necropsy report.  There, 
the decedent's widow sought benefits under a policy covering 
accidental death.  The trial court found that statements in those 
documents could mislead the jury because the legal meaning of the 
phrase "accidental death" as defined and used in the insurance 
policy could differ from its meaning as used in the medical 
reports.  To avoid this problem, the court excised from the 
documents any reference to the death as accidental.  We held that 
the court properly used Rule 403 to avoid unfair prejudice and 
confusion.   
In ruling that references to mesothelioma in various documents 
would be redacted, the district court articulated its Rule 403 
balancing as follows: 
[T]he diagnosis of mesothelioma is a diagnosis that 
must be subjected to examination and cross-examination 
. . . . [I]t is my ruling that under Rule 403 that 
there is an unfair risk of unfair prejudice for you to 
be able to argue that 9 other doctors unexamined in 
this Court diagnosed mesothelioma, which at best has a 
-- only a 90 percent chance of diagnosis as I 
understand the testimony through autopsy being correct. 
And a 60 percent chance at being correct if there is a 
tissue sample excised from the lung as opposed to a 
needle point examination where the risk of being right 
is - - the chance of being right is only 40 percent. . 
. . [I]n terms of trustworthiness of the diagnosis, 
it's not like there was a bone that's broken, the bone 
is broken.  Here you have a diagnosis of mesothelioma 
which is something that has to be examined as to method 
of diagnosis, technique of diagnosis, certainty of 
diagnosis.  
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It may be argued that the difficulty of the diagnosis affects the 
weight to be accorded the documents' contents, not their 
admissibility.  This is not necessarily so; however, the 
difficulty of the diagnosis does indeed go more to the weight 
than to the admissibility of the evidence, but that does not make 
it irrelevant to admissibility in light of Rule 403.  In addition 
to the independent Rule 403 hurdle, Rule 803(6) and Rule 803(8) 
expressly contemplate exclusion based on untrustworthiness. 
The court, based on its determination that mesothelioma is 
difficult to diagnose, determined that the risk of unfair 
prejudice, by leaving references to mesothelioma in documents not 
testified to by their authors nor relied on by qualified experts, 
outweighed their probative value.  And, according to the court, 
because of problems in accurately diagnosing mesothelioma, the 
unexamined references were not helpful to and could potentially 
have misled the jury.  The court's ruling requiring that 
references to mesothelioma in various documents be redacted was 
neither arbitrary nor irrational, and will be affirmed. 
IV. 
Because we find that the court erred by excluding certain 
testimony, we can affirm the jury's verdict on liability only if 
those errors were harmless.  See Advanced Medical, Inc. v. Arden 
Medical Systems, Inc., 955 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1992).  "A 
determination of harmless error depends on whether it is highly 
probable that the error did not contribute to the judgment."  Id. 
at 199. 
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In McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 923 (3d Cir. 
1985), we found that the district court's refusal to admit 
evidence impaired the defendants' ability to discredit a central 
element of the plaintiff's case, was critical for defense against 
liability, was potentially the defendants' best evidence and was 
not cumulative.  As a result, we could not say that it was highly 
probable that the failure to admit the evidence did not affect 
the defendants' substantial rights, and we reversed the district 
court.  Hence, if including the improperly excluded testimony 
makes it more likely that the jury would have reached a different 
decision, the error is not harmless. 
Here, the testimony by plaintiff's experts bore on the critical 
issue of whether John Holbrook had mesothelioma caused by 
exposure to asbestos, and the treating physician's testimony 
about his diagnosis may have been Holbrook's best evidence on the 
existence of mesothelioma.  Likewise, Dr. Altschuler's testimony 
eliminating radiation as a cause was crucial to a finding that 
asbestos, not radiation, caused John Holbrook's mesothelioma. 
This makes it difficult to say that it is highly improbable that 
admitting this evidence would not affect the outcome.  To the 
contrary, it appears that it would.  Because we cannot say that 
these errors were harmless, Holbrook is entitled to a new trial.4 
                                                           
4
  Holbrook makes other assignments of error, and argues, without 
further analysis, that the rulings were an abuse of discretion 
and that the "multitude of error requires reversal and a new 
trial."  As we have stated, we will grant Holbrook a new trial.  
The unsupported allegations of error are generally without merit, 
however, even if error, they would not require a new trial. 
Following our course in Schulz, we leave these issues for further 
development at the next trial. 
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Holbrook also asserts that the district judge's conduct at trial 
prejudiced her case.  Holbrook urges us to examine her attempts 
to conduct direct examination of her medical experts. According 
to Holbrook, "[t]he actions of the trial judge, taken as a whole, 
effectively communicated to the jury that the judge had a low 
opinion of plaintiff's case and her counsel."      
Unquestionably, bias and improper conduct by a trial 
judge may be grounds for a new trial if a party was 
unfairly prejudiced.  Active participation by a 
district judge in trial proceedings, however, is in 
itself neither improper nor unfair. 
Desjardins v. Van Buren Community Hospital, 969 F.2d 1280 (1st 
Cir. 1992). 
The district court's conduct (as distinguished from its 
evidentiary rulings) does not warrant a new trial.  The court 
interrupted counsel for both sides repeatedly and tried to 
instruct both sides on the proper procedure to follow in certain 
lines of questioning.  Although the court's demeanor may have 
been gruff at times, Holbrook's counsel seemed to be testing the 
court by pursuing issues on which the court had previously made 
its rulings clear.  This conduct falls squarely within the 
judge's role of controlling the court proceedings, and cannot be 
fairly characterized as prejudicing plaintiff or unduly 
humiliating counsel.  The trial judge's role is to preside over 
the trial; passively if possible but aggressively when indicated. 
The judge's efforts must vary with the exigencies of the trial. 
Inadequately prepared or overly aggressive advocates may indeed 
require that the trial court interpose itself more actively and 
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even forcefully in the proceedings to assure fairness.  That, we 
are convinced, is what the trial court did here.5 
V. 
In sum, because we conclude that the district court committed 
reversible error by precluding the treating physician's testimony 
about his diagnosis of mesothelioma and his reliance on the 
pathology report and by restricting the pulmonologist's testimony 
from eliminating radiation as a cause of the mesothelioma, we 
will reverse the judgment in favor of defendants and remand the 
cause for a new trial.  Her request that we reassign the case to 
a new judge on remand is denied. 
                         
  
                                                           
5
  Liteky v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1147 (1994) supports the 
proposition that we have the power to assign the case to another 
judge on remand if we determine recusal is necessary or if we 
determine that reassignment is required for "further proceedings 
to be had as may be just under the circumstances."  Id. at 1157. 
"[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for 
a bias or partiality motion." Id. at 1157.  In view of our 
holding here, however, we need not spend more time on Holbrook's 
request for retrial before a different judge.  Her request is 
rejected. 
Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., et al., No. 94-2148 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, concurring in part 
       and dissenting in part: 
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 Although I join in Parts II and III of the opinion I do 
not believe the district court's rulings on the testimony of Dr. 
Carpenter and Dr. Altschuler require granting a new trial. 
I. 
 Dr. Carpenter, a specialist in internal medicine, was 
John Holbrook's treating physician.  The district court did not 
permit Dr. Carpenter to state that he diagnosed Holbrook with 
mesothelioma because pathologists at Holy Cross Hospital rather 
than Dr. Carpenter actually "made" the diagnosis.  ("[Carpenter] 
himself did not make the diagnosis.  He may have relied upon a 
report of a diagnosis.").   While the district court's ruling may 
reflect too rigid a view of the diagnostic process, I do not 
believe its limitation of Dr. Carpenter's testimony constituted 
reversible error.  Reversal and remand for a new trial is 
justified only where a trial judge's erroneous exclusion of 
evidence is not harmless.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 provides in part: 
No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence ... is ground for 
granting a new trial or for setting aside a 
verdict ... unless refusal to take such 
action appears to the court inconsistent with 
substantial justice. 
 
Although the district court excluded testimony by Dr. Carpenter, 
there still was substantial evidence from other sources that 
Holbrook suffered from mesothelioma.  Most important was the 
testimony of Dr. Reineke,6 a board certified pathologist and the 
                                                           
6
  The testimony of Dr. Reineke was taken by videotape and 
presented at trial. 
28 
chief of pathology at Holy Cross Hospital, who testified Holbrook 
had mesothelioma.7   
 The crucial issue at trial was causation -- whether 
John Holbrook died from mesothelioma as a result of asbestos 
exposure or as a result of radiation exposure.  Given the ample 
evidence that John Holbrook suffered from mesothelioma, it is 
highly probable the district court's refusal to allow Dr. 
Carpenter to state his diagnosis did not contribute to the 
judgment of the jury.  Any error was harmless. 
II. 
 At a pretrial deposition, Dr. Altschuler, who was board 
certified in internal and pulmonary medicine, admitted he had no 
familiarity with the medical literature on the relationship 
between radiation and mesothelioma.  He said he was not aware 
that radiation had ever been linked to mesothelioma. 
Nevertheless, the district court did not preclude Dr. Altschuler 
from testifying based on knowledge derived from medical 
literature he read subsequent to his deposition but prior to 
trial.  ("You may ask him what literature he refers to with 
respect to radiation and what does it say, if you choose.").  In 
short, although the court refused to qualify Dr. Altschuler as an 
expert on radiation, it allowed him to testify about what he 
knew. 
                                                           
7
  Despite the district court's rulings, evidence presented to 
the jury included unredacted references to mesothelioma in  
hospital medical records.  Furthermore, Dr. Demopoulos, a board 
certified pathologist, testified that the autopsy report listed 
"malignant mesothelioma" as the cause of Holbrook's death. 
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 In view of Dr. Altschuler's background and the court's 
admission of his testimony on radiation and mesothelioma, I 
cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion in 
refusing to qualify Dr. Altschuler as an expert on radiation and 
limiting his testimony.  Moreover, plaintiff called Francis 
Masse, director of the radiation protection programs at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Dr. David Hoel, 
chairman of the Department of Biometry and Epidemiology at the 
Medical University of South Carolina, to testify that radiation 
did not cause her husband's illness.  In light of their 
testimony, the district court's limitation on Dr. Altschuler's 
testimony was harmless. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, I would deny plaintiff's 
request for a new trial. 
 
 
       
          
    
